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Abstract
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the
total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make
the allocation and payment decisions online with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We consider
two models of unknown supply: the adversarial supply model, in which the mechanism must produce a
welfare guarantee for any arbitrary supply, and the stochastic supply model, in which supply is drawn
from a distribution known to the mechanism, and the mechanism need only provide a welfare guarantee
in expectation.
Our main result is a separation between these two models. We show that all truthful mechanisms,
even randomized, achieve a diminishing fraction of the optimal social welfare (namely, no better than a
Ω(log logn) approximation) in the adversarial setting. In sharp contrast, in the stochastic model, under
a standard monotone hazard-rate condition, we present a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant
approximation. We show that the monotone hazard rate condition is necessary, and also characterize
a natural subclass of truthful mechanisms in our setting, the set of online-envy-free mechanisms. All
of the mechanisms we present fall into this class, and we prove almost optimal lower bounds for such
mechanisms. Since auctions with unknown supply are regularly run in many online-advertising settings,
our main results emphasize the importance of considering distributional information in the design of
auctions in such environments.
1 Introduction
Auctions have recently received attention in computer science because they crystalize many of the incentive
issues in algorithmic game theory, and have direct application to the fast-growing market for online adver-
tising. This paper belongs to a line of research that studies online mechanism design, which focuses on
markets in which decisions are made dynamically before information regarding the state of the world has
been fully revealed. Previous work in online mechanism design mainly concerned settings where customers
that arrive dynamically compete for buying a known set of items (see a recent survey [25]). However, in
many real-world settings the supply arrives dynamically and the exact number of items for sale is uncertain.
This, for example, is the case in the sale of clicks on banner ads, where the number of clicks is not known in
advance to the seller; Such a seller must decide which advertisement to show in a fraction of a second after
the item arrives, while the future supply is uncertain.1
In this work, we investigate a natural online setting, in which a mechanism must allocate items to a fixed
set of bidders when the supply of items is unknown, and arrives online. We require that the mechanism
allocates items and extracts payment for them as they arrive. The restriction that the mechanism extract
payment at the time of sale is a natural practical constraint, and is satisfied by most real-world markets.
Even in markets in which customers are able to defer their payments (such as auctions for search ads),
the seller typically calculates payments immediately, which allows customers to better keep track of their
spending. We introduce a stochastic model where the seller knows how the supply is distributed, but we do
not assume any prior distribution on the bidders’ valuations, nor do we require that the bidders know how
the supply is distributed. One of the conceptual contributions of our paper is this hybrid stochastic model, in
which the supply is drawn from some prior distribution, but no distributional assumptions are made on the
preferences of the bidders. This captures scenarios such as online advertising, in which sellers can easily
collect statistics on the supply (e.g., number of ad impressions per day) but obtaining statistics on the actual
valuations of the bidders is harder and may requires modeling, for example, their equilibrium behavior.
Most of the recent work in computer science on online mechanism design has been in the fully adversarial
setting, when in actuality, mechanism designers have a wealth of distributional information at their disposal.
In economics, at the other extreme, dynamic mechanism design has been recently studied in a full Bayesian
setting that assumes the existence of prior distributions on the bidders’ preferences.
We wish to maximize social welfare, which is a desirable goal even from the perspective of a for-profit
seller that does not have the luxury of operating under monopoly conditions. An economically efficient
market (one that maximizes the combined welfare of the customers and the seller) will be more attractive to
customers, and avoids harming the seller in the long term at the expense of short-term profits. In fact, the
generalized second price auction currently used to sell search advertisements has social welfare, rather than
revenue guarantees [10].
We explore the cost of ignoring distributional information. We produce a strong separation: Our main
results are lower bounds in the adversarial setting, and truthful approximation mechanisms in the stochastic
setting.
Notably, the algorithmic problem that we face is simple. If bidder valuations were known, then the
greedy algorithm which simply allocated each arriving item to the unsatisfied bidder with the highest value
would achieve optimal social welfare even in the adversarial supply setting. The difficulty of the problem
stems from the fact that bidders may misrepresent their valuations for personal gain. Any allocation rule that
we design must be associated with a corresponding payment rule which incentivizes bidders to truthfully
report their valuations. As we shall show, the incentive constraint proves to be an insurmountable barrier to
developing mechanisms guaranteeing a constant approximation to social welfare in the adversarial supply
setting, but can be overcome in the stochastic supply setting.
1.1 Our Results
We first consider the adversarial supply setting in which welfare guarantees are required to hold for any
realization of supply. Our first main result are lower bounds on the approximation obtainable by truthful
1 Uncertainty on the supply appears in various environments. More examples include markets for computing resources and also
traditional markets, like agricultural markets, where produce and fish continue to arrive after markets has been opened.
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mechanisms:
Theorem: Every truthful mechanism achieves a diminishing fraction (in the number of bidders) of the
optimal social welfare. Specifically, no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves better than n-approximation
and no randomized truthful mechanism achieves better than Ω(log log n)-approximation.
The linear lower bound is simple, and is in the spirit of the lower bound given by Lavi and Nisan
[19] for a model in which bidders that arrive online bid for a fixed set of expiring items. We note that
an n-approximation to social welfare can be achieved by the trivial mechanism which simply allocates
the first item to the highest bidder at the second highest price, and does not allocate any additional items.
The randomized lower bound is more technically challenging. To prove it we give a characterization of
truthful mechanisms in our setting, and a distribution over bidder values. From this, we derive a system
of equations that can be simultaneously satisfied only if there exists a mechanism which achieves a strong
welfare guarantee when given this distribution over bidders. We show that no such satisfying assignment
exists, which gives the lower bound.
If we further require that our mechanisms be online envy-free (a desirable fairness property that we define
in section 5), we can strengthen the above lower bound to show that no randomized truthful mechanism can
achieve better than an Ω(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare. We show that this last result is
almost tight by giving a truthful, online-envy-free mechanism which achieves a log n approximation to social
welfare. We leave open the problem of closing the gap between our upper and lower bounds for non-envy-
free randomized mechanisms, which seems to require different techniques. All our lower bounds hold even
for algorithms that are not computationally restricted, while our upper bounds follow from computationally
efficient mechanisms.
Given the impossibility in the adversarial model, we then consider the stochastic supply setting in which
supply is drawn from a distribution D known to the mechanism, and welfare guarantees are required to hold
in expectation over D. We make the assumption (standard in mechanism design in other contexts) that D
has a non-decreasing hazard rate2. Our second main result is a positive one:
Theorem: There exists a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant approximation to social welfare
when supply is drawn from a known distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate.
This mechanism is simple, deterministic, computationally efficient, and easy to implement, but it’s
analysis is surprisingly subtle. We stress that the incentive properties of the mechanisms we give do not rely
on any distributional information. In particular, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every set of bids,
for every supply, and for any realization of the coin flips of the mechanism (truthful ”in the universal sense”,
see [24, 9]), not only in expectation. Truthfulness in expectation over supply realization would require that
all the bidders and the seller share the same beliefs on how the supply is distributed. This is unlikely either
because bidders do not have the resources needed for estimating these priors, or, because they may have
private information that creates heterogeneity in their beliefs (see, e.g., [2]).3
We also show that the non-decreasing hazard rate assumption is necessary: no deterministic mechanism
can achieve a constant approximation (or, in particular, better than an Ω(
√
log n/ log log n) approximation)
to social welfare over arbitrary distributions. As mentioned, our mechanism is deterministic, and does
not involve randomization techniques used in previous papers for obtaining truthful approximations (like
random sampling, see [14, 9]).
Finally, we also consider the setting in which the bidders preferences may exhibit complementarities
for multiple items (increasing marginal utilities). We study the the extreme case of knapsack valuations (or
single-minded bidders) and show strong lower bounds (even in the stochastic supply setting) on the compet-
itive ratio that any algorithm can achieve, even without incentive constraints. We provide an algorithm with
an exactly matching competitive ratio to prove that our lower bound is tight.
2A cumulative distributionF with density f has non-decreasing hazard rate (sometimes called monotone hazard rate) if f(x)
1−F (x)
is non-decreasing with x.
3We note that in the stochastic setting, we can achieve optimal welfare using expected VCG prices if we were to require only
truthfulness in expectation over the supply ℓ. However, this seems to be a weak solution concept, since bidders may be motivated
to misrepresent their valuations if their understanding of the supply distribution D differs from the mechanism’s, or if they are not
risk-neutral. In this paper, we show that positive results can be achieved even with this stronger solution concept.
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1.2 Related Work
The works most related to ours are Mahdian and Saberi [20], Cole, Dobzinski, and Fleischer [7] and Lavi
and Nisan [19]. Mahdian and Saberi [20] is the only other work that we are aware of to study mechanisms
in which the supply is unknown and arrives online. They study the sale of multiple types of goods to bidders
who desire only a single item, and wish to design mechanisms to maximize revenue. They consider only the
adversarial supply setting, and allow extracting all payments when the entire supply has been exhausted . In
this model, they give a truthful mechanism that is constant competitive with respect to the optimal auction
that is restricted to selling all items at a single price, and show a lower bound of (e+1)/e. Their mechanism
is randomized, and is based on random-sampling techniques to achieve truthfulness.
Cole, Dobzinski, and Fleischer [7] introduce the concept of prompt mechanisms, which impose the
natural condition that bidders learn their payment immediately upon winning an item. They observe that
mechanisms which are not prompt are often unusable, because, e.g., they tie up bidders to the auction for
too long, they make debt collection difficult, and they require a high level of trust in the auctioneer. They
study prompt mechanisms for a problem in which the supply of m expiring items is fixed and known to
the mechanism, but the bidders arrive and depart online. They wish to maximize social welfare, and give
a truthful logm competitive mechanism, and show a lower bound of 2 even for randomized mechanisms.
Similar models of online auctions with expiring goods were studied earlier by Lavi and Nisan [19] and by
Hajiaghayi et al. [13]. These models relate to ours since the allocation decisions for items with expiration
date (airline tickets, for instance) must be made online. In these papers, however, there is no uncertainty on
the supply and bidders arrive and depart over time. More on online auctions, which were first discussed by
Lavi and Nisan [18], can be found in the survey [25].
A recent line of papers studies online mechanism design in a Bayesian setting ([5, 3, 4]), where welfare-
maximizing, and even budget balanced, generalizations of VCG mechanisms are presented for online set-
tings. Our paper does not assume a Bayesian preference model and, as our lower bounds show, socially-
efficient outcomes cannot be truthfully implemented. In the economics literature, stochastic supply has not
been studied in many papers. Most of this work (see, for example, [16, 23]) studied a Bayesian model,
and focused on the characterization of equilibrium prices. Uncertain supply models can be viewed as more
complicated versions of the classic sequential auctions model, which is technically hard to analyze even
without uncertainty on the supply (see, e.g., [21, 26]).
While our paper focuses on auctions for identical goods with bidders that are interested in a single item,
we briefly discuss a more general domain in which single minded bidders are interested in multiple items
in Section 6. Knapsack auctions (or auctions for single-minded bidders) were studied by [1, 8] for static
settings with known supply.
We proceed as follows. After presenting our formal model in the next section, we present our main
results in Sections 3 (adversarial supply) and 4 (stochastic supply). We then discuss online-envy-free mech-
anisms in Section 5 and strengthen our lower bounds, and consider Knapsack valuations in Section 6.
2 Model and Definitions
We consider a set of n bidders {1, . . . , n}, each desires a single item from a set of identical items (except
in Section 6 in which we expand our model to agents interested in multiple items.) Each bidder has a
non-negative valuation vi for an item. A mechanism M is a (possibly randomized) allocation rule paired
with a payment rule. Bidders report their valuations to the mechanism before any item arrives, and the
mechanism assigns items as they arrive to bidders, and simultaneously charges each bidder i some price pi.
When ℓ items arrive and bidders have submitted bids v′1, . . . , v′n, we denote the outcome of the mechanism
by Mℓ((v′1, . . . , v′n), r) where r is a random bitstring which may be used by randomized mechanisms. We
note that the mechanism is unaware of ℓ, as it only encounters the items one at a time as they arrive. We
will leave out the r when it is clear from context. We adopt standard notation and write v′−i to denote the
set of valuations reported by all bidders other than bidder i. A bidder i who receives an item obtains utility
ui(vi;Mℓ(v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n)) = vi − pi. Bidders who do not receive an item obtain utility 0. Bidders wish to
maximize their own utility, and may misrepresent their valuations to the mechanism in order to do so.
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We require that our mechanisms be truthful: that bidders should be incentivized to report their true
valuations, regardless of the bids of others or the realizations of the supply. Following the literature (e.g.
Goldberg et al. [11], Guruswami et al. [12]) we define a randomized truthful mechanism to be a probability
distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is (ex-post) truthful if for every bidder i with value vi, for every set of bids
v′−i, for every alternative bid v′i and for every r and ℓ: ui(vi;Mℓ((vi, v′−i), r)) ≥ ui(vi;Mℓ((v′i, v′−i), r))
We will assume that bidders submit their true valuations to truthful mechanisms, since it is a dominant
strategy for them to do so.
Without loss of generality, we imagine that v1, . . . , vn are written in non-increasing order. The social
welfare achieved by a mechanism is the sum of the values of the bidders to whom it has allocated items,
which we denote by W (Mℓ((v1, . . . , vn), r)). When ℓ items arrive, we will denote the optimal social
welfare by OPTℓ =
∑ℓ
i=1 vi. When ℓ is drawn from a distribution D over the support (w.l.o.g.) {1, ..., n},
we define OPT = Eℓ[OPTℓ] =
∑n
i=1OPTi · Pr[l = i].
We will be concerned with approximation guarantees to social welfare in both the adversarial supply
setting and the stochastic supply setting.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism M achieves an α-approximation to social welfare in the adversarial supply
setting if for every supply ℓ: OPTℓEr[W (Mℓ((v1,...,vn),r))] ≤ α
When ℓ is drawn from a distribution D, a mechanism M achieves an α-approximation to social welfare
in the stochastic supply setting if: Eℓ[OPTℓ]Eℓ,r [W (Mℓ((v1,...,vn),r))] ≤ α
In the stochastic setting, we will assume unless otherwise specified that D satisfies the non-decreasing
hazard rate condition:
Definition 2.3. The hazard rate of a distribution D at i is: hi(D) = Pr[ℓ=i]Pr[ℓ≥i] . We write simply hi when the
distribution is clear from context.
D satisfies the non-decreasing hazard rate condition if hi(D) is a non-decreasing sequence in i.
The non-decreasing hazard rate condition is standard in mechanism design (see, for example, [22, 17]
and recent computer-science work [6, 15]), and is satisfied by many natural distributions, including the
exponential, uniform, and binomial distributions.
One might also consider an intermediate model in which supply is drawn from a distribution satisfying
the non-decreasing hazard rate condition, but the distribution is unknown to the mechanism. However, we
note that since point distributions satisfy the hazard rate condition, adversarial supply is a special case of
this model, and so our lower bounds apply.
3 Adversarial Supply
In this section we consider the adversarial model in which we do not have a distribution over supply and
we require a good approximation to social welfare for any number of items that arrive. We first show that
deterministic truthful mechanisms cannot achieve any approximation better than the trivial n-approximation.
We then consider randomized mechanisms, and give a lower bound of Ω(log log n), proving in particular
that no constant approximation is possible.
3.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
We begin by proving that deterministic mechanisms can only achieve a trivial approximation. We present
a sketch of the proof and defer the details to Appendix A.1. First, we characterize deterministic truthful
mechanisms by two useful observations:
Lemma 3.1. For every truthful mechanism and for any realization of items, the price pb that bidder b is
charged upon winning (any) item is independent of his bid.
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Lemma 3.2. For every truthful mechanism and for any realization of items, if bidder b wins an item, which
item bidder b wins is independent of his bid whenever pb < vb.
Theorem 3.3. No deterministic truthful mechanism can achieve better than an n approximation to social
welfare.
Proof. (Sketch) We show that if the mechanism achieves any finite approximation to social welfare, every
bidder has a bid such that he is allocated the first item. Applying lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we conclude that any
deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves a finite approximation to social welfare can only sell a single
item, which implies that it cannot achieve better than an n approximation when all bidders have the same
value for an item. See the appendix for further details.
3.2 Randomized Mechanisms
3.2.1 An Ω(log log n) lower bound
We next present our first main result, a lower bound for randomized truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 3.4. No truthful randomized mechanism can achieve an o(log log n) approximation to social
welfare when faced with adversarial supply.
Proof. A truthful randomized mechanism is simply a probability distribution over deterministic truthful
mechanisms. To prove our randomized lower bound, we will exhibit a distribution over bidder values such
that no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves a good approximation to welfare in expectation over this
random instance. By Yao’s min-max principle, this is sufficient to prove a lower bound on randomized
mechanisms.
We define a distribution V with support over values 1/2i for 0 ≤ i ≤ log n − 1. For each realization
v ∈ V , we let: Pr[v = 1/2i] = 2i/(n − 1). Therefore, we have Pr[v ≥ 1/2i] = (2i+1 − 1)/(n − 1) and
E[v|v ≥ 1/2i] = (i+ 1)/(2i+1 − 1).
Lemma 3.5. Consider a set of n valuations drawn from V and let OPTk denote the sum of the k highest
valuations from the set. Then: E[OPTk] ≥ Hk+1 − 1 where Hk+1 denotes the k + 1st harmonic number.
In particular, E[OPTk] > (log k)/2.
Proof. We defer this proof to Appendix A.2.
By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we may characterize deterministic truthful mechanisms as follows: The
mechanism assigns to each bidder b a bin ib and a threshold tb. ib and tb are independent of b’s bid vb, but
are assigned such that at most one bidder in each bin can have a bid above his threshold.4 If vb > tb, b wins
item i (if it arrives) at price tb. Equivalently, we may imagine the mechanism operating by ordering bidders
in some permutation π such that for all i, every bidder in bucket i is ordered before every bidder in bucket
j > i. When the first item arrives, the mechanism offers it to each bidder at their threshold price, in order of
π until some bidder b accepts. We continue in this manner, offering the next item to bidders starting at b+1
until one accepts, etc.
We construct a distribution over instances by drawing each bidder’s valuation independently from the
distribution V described above. Since bidder’s thresholds and buckets are independent of their own bids,
each value encountered by the mechanism when making offers in order of π is distributed randomly accord-
ing to V (note that although the values are distributed randomly, they need not be independent of each other).
We may assume without loss of generality that each threshold tb = 1/2cb for some cb ∈ 0, . . . , log n− 1.
When all n items arrive, the expected welfare achieved by a mechanism is:
∑n
b=1 Pr[vb ≥
1
2cb ] ·
E[vb|vb ≥
1
2cb ] =
1
n−1
∑n
b=1(cb+1). Let Nb denote the number of items sold by a mechanism after making
offers to b bidders. Then we have more generally, when k items arrive, the expected welfare achieved by a
mechanism is:
∑n
b=1 Pr[vb ≥
1
2cb ] ·E[vb|vb ≥
1
2cb ] · Pr[Nb−1 < k] =
1
n−1
∑n
b=1(cb + 1)Pr[Nb−1 < k]. If
4An example of such a function is for each bidder’s threshold to be the highest bid of any other bidder in his bin. This results
in exactly one bidder (the highest) having a bid above his threshold, while maintaining the property that each bidders threshold is
independent of his bid.
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our mechanism achieves an α approximation to social welfare, we therefore have the following n constraints
on the values of cb chosen by the mechanism. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
n∑
b=1
(cb + 1)Pr[Nb−1 < k] ≥
(n− 1)OPTk
α
≥
(n− 1) log k
2α
(1)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.5. After offering the item to b bidders, the expected number
of sales is E[Nb] = 1/(n − 1) ·
∑b
i=1(2
cb+1 − 1).
By a Chernoff bound: Pr[Nb−1 < k] ≤ exp(−(E[Nb−1]2 − k+1)) ≤ exp(−
Pb−1
i=1 2
ci
n−1 + k). Let bk be the
first index such that
∑bk
i=1 2
ci ≥ (n − 1) · k. Then by plugging our bound into constraint 1, we have for all
k:
bk∑
i=1
(ci + 1) +
n∑
i=bk+1
(ci + 1)
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj
n−1 )
≥
(n− 1) log k
2α
Lemma 3.6. For ci ∈ [0, log n− 1]:
n∑
i=bk+1
(ci + 1)
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj
n−1 )
< 2.5 · n
Proof. We defer the proof of this technical lemma to Appendix A.2.
So, for all k, there must exist an integer bk such that simultaneously the two equations hold:
∑bk
i=1 ci ≥
(n−1) log k
2α − (2.5 · n + bk), and
∑bk−1
i=1 2
ci < (n − 1) · k. In particular, if k ≥ 215α and n ≥ 30, then
n log k
4α ≤
(n−1) log k
2α − 3.5n. Therefore, there must exist integers bk to satisfy the equations:
bk∑
i=1
ci ≥
n log k
4α
(2)
bk−1∑
i=1
2ci < n · k (3)
We will consider the smallest such set of bk: For all k, we will have that
∑bk
i=1 ci ≥
n log k
4α , but∑bk−1
i=1 ci <
n log k
4α . Note that if we reduce a larger bk in this manner, inequality 3 continues to hold,
and so this is without loss of generality.
We let k = 215α and consider the sequence of integers k, 2k, 4k, . . . , 2tk such that n ≥ 2tk > n/2. For
j ≥ 1 we write ∆jk = (b2jk − b2j−1k), and ∆0k = bk. We note that from inequality 2 and our assumption on
the bk, we have:
∑b
2jk
i=b
2j−1k
ci ≥
n(log k+j)
4α −
∑b(k·2j−1)−1
i=1 ci ≥
n
4α .
Exponentiating both sides and applying the AM-GM inequality we have:
2n/(4α∆
j
k
) ≤

 b2jk∏
i=b
2j−1k
2ci


1/∆j
k
≤
∑b
2jk
i=b
2j−1k
2ci
∆jk
≤
n(2jk + 1)
∆jk
where the last inequality follows from inequality 3. This gives us: ∆jk ≥
n
4α(log n+log(2j+1k)−log∆j
k
)
. We can
expand the above recursive bound to isolate ∆jk and find ∆
j
k = Ω(n/(α(j + α))).
We recall that n > b2tk =
∑t
i=0∆
i
k. Using the above bound, we see that n is at least
∑t
i=0Ω(n/(α(i+
α))) = Ω(n log(t/α)α ). Therefore, we have α ≥ Θ(log(t/α)) and so α ≥ Θ(log t). We recall that k = 2
15α
and 2tk = 215α+t ≤ n. t is therefore constrained such that: log n ≥ 15α + t ≥ Θ(t). And so we may take
t to be as large as Θ(log n), giving us a lower bound of α ≥ Θ(log log n).
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3.2.2 A truthful log n-approximation mechanism
Here we show a simple randomized mechanism that achieves a log n approximation to social welfare. In
Section 5 we show that this is nearly optimal for the natural class of ”online envy-free” mechanisms.
Let RandomGuess be the mechanism that selects a supply g ∈ {2, 4, 8, . . . , 2i, . . . , n} uniformly at
random, and considers only the highest g bidders according to permutation order. When an item arrives the
mechanism sells it to the first of the remaining such bidders and charges him vg+1.5
Proposition 3.7. RandomGuess is truthful and achieves a log n approximation to social welfare.
Proof. We defer this proof to Section A.2 in the Appendix.
We leave open the problem of closing the gap between the log n factor achieved by RandomGuess and
theΩ(log log n) lower bound of Theorem 3.4. In section 5 we strengthen this lower bound toΩ(log n/ log log n)
for the class of online-envy-free mechanisms, also defined in section 5. We conjecture that RandomGuess is
optimal.
4 Stochastic Supply
Given the strong lower bounds we have shown in the adversarial setting, we now consider the stochastic
setting in which supply is drawn from some distribution D known to the mechanism. In this section, we
give our second main result, a deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves an O(1)-approximation to
social welfare for any distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate. At the end of this section we show that
the monotone hazard rate condition is actually necessary to achieve constant approximation.
We consider the following mechanism that takes as input a distribution D. The mechanism is determin-
istic, so all probabilities are over the distribution D. We note that the mechanism decides on a maximal
number of items it is going to sell without looking at the bids. Although it seems somewhat surprising it still
achieves good approximation when the non-decreasing hazard rate condition holds.
HazardGuess(D):
1. Fix an arbitrary permutation π on the bidders.
2. Solicit bids, and denote them v1, . . . , vn in non-increasing order.
3. Let s∗ be the smallest integer such that s∗ ≥ Pr[ℓ≥s
∗]
Pr[ℓ=s∗] . If s
∗ > 3 let g = s∗. Otherwise let g = 1. a
4. Consider only the highest g bidders ordered according to π.
When an item arrives sell it to the first of the remaining such bidders and charge him vg+1 (or 0
if g = n).
aAlternatively, we can pick g = s∗ always, but then we must pick a random permutation in step 1 of HazardGuess.
We choose to present a deterministic mechanism.
Theorem 4.1. HazardGuess(D) is truthful, and achieves a 1678 -approximation to social welfare in expec-
tation over D, for any distribution D such that the hazard rate hi(D) is non-decreasing.
Truthfulness is immediate: Every bidder with bid higher than vg+1 faces a single take-it-or-leave-it offer
at the same price (vg+1). The offer and the order in which they receive the offer is independent of their own
bids. To prove the approximation guarantee, we will need a series of lemmas.
The following lemmas, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5 will show that for any distribution with non-decreasing hazard
rate, maxiOPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥ i] ≥ OPT/5. To complete the proof, we will then prove that HazardGuess
achieves welfare at least (8/27) ·maxiOPTi ·Pr[ℓ ≥ i], and thus achieves a 1678 approximation to OPT.
5The authors thank Andrew Goldberg for suggesting this mechanism, which is a significant simplification of our original mech-
anism.
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Lemma 4.2. Let α be the smallest value such that for any set of bids, OPT/(maxiOPTi ·Pr[ℓ ≥ i]) ≤ α.
Then for each integer 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 we have the following bound on α in terms of D, which we denote
Bound(s):
α ≤
s∑
i=1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
+
∑n
i=s+1 Pr[ℓ = i] · i
(s+ 1) · Pr[ℓ ≥ s+ 1]
Proof. Suppose α > β. That is, there exists a set of bids such that for all i we have OPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥ i] <
OPT/β, or equivalently:
OPTi <
OPT
β · Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
(4)
Recall that by definition, we have OPT =
∑n
i=1OPTi · Pr[ℓ = i]. Observe that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1:
OPTi+1 ≤
i+1
i OPTi since v1, . . . , vn is a non-increasing sequence. By repeated application of this
observation, we get the following n upper-bounds on OPT indexed by 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 1:
OPT ≤
s∑
i=1
OPTi · Pr[ℓ = i] +OPTs+1 ·
(
n∑
i=s+1
i
s+ 1
Pr[ℓ = i]
)
Applying inequality 4 and multiplying both sides by β/OPT we obtain:
β <
(
s∑
i=1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
+
∑n
i=s+1 Pr[ℓ = i] · i
(s+ 1) · Pr[ℓ ≥ s+ 1]
)
.
If α is the optimal approximation factor, there is some input such that for every ǫ > 0,maxiOPTi ·Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
achieves an α approximation but does not achieve a β = α − ǫ approximation, and the above bound on β
holds. Since α = β + ǫ, letting ǫ tend to zero, we obtain the lemma.
Remark 4.3. We must now show that for every distribution D, there exists an s such that Bound(s) gives
α ≤ 5. Note that the order of quantifiers is important! It is not the case that there exists an s such that for
every distribution, Bound(s) gives α ≤ O(1).
Lemma 4.4. For any s ≥ 1 and hi ∈ [1/s, 1]:
∑n
i=s+1
(
i · hi ·
∏i−1
j=s+1(1− hj)
)
≤ 3s + 1.
Proof. We defer the proof of this technical lemma to Appendix A.3.
Lemma 4.5. For any set of bids, and for any distribution D with non-decreasing hazard rate,
OPT
maxi OPTi·Pr[ℓ≥i]
≤ 5.
Proof. Given a distribution D, we wish to find the value of s such that Bound(s) gives the sharpest bound
on α (the approximation factor from lemma 4.2). We choose s∗ ≤ n to be the smallest integer such that
s∗ ≥ Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗]/Pr[ℓ = s∗]. If no such s∗ exists, we choose s∗ = n. We now show that Bound(s∗) gives
α ≤ 5. We bound the two terms of Bound(s∗) separately. Consider the first term:
s∗∑
i=1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
≤ (s∗ − 1) ·
Pr[ℓ = s∗ − 1]
Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ − 1]
+
Pr[ℓ = s∗]
Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗]
≤ 1 +
Pr[ℓ = s∗]
Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗]
≤ 2
since the hazard rate is non-decreasing and by definition of s. We now consider the second term:
Pn
i=s∗+1 Pr[ℓ=i]·i
(s∗+1)·Pr[ℓ≥s∗+1]
Since D has a non-decreasing hazard rate, we know that for all i ≥ s∗, hi ≡ Pr[ℓ = i]/Pr[ℓ ≥ i] ≥ 1/s∗.
Therefore, we have:
n∑
i=s∗+1
Pr[ℓ = i] · i =
n∑
i=s∗+1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
· Pr[ℓ ≥ i] · i
=
n∑
i=s∗+1

i · hi · Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ + 1] · i−1∏
j=s∗+1
(1− hj)


≤ Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ + 1](3s∗ + 1)
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where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.4. Therefore, finally we have for all s∗:∑n
i=s∗+1 Pr[ℓ = i] · i
(s∗ + 1) · Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ + 1]
≤
Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ + 1](3s∗ + 1)
(s∗ + 1) · Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗ + 1]
≤ 3
Combining these two bounds, we finally get that Bound(s∗) gives α ≤ 5.
Now we are ready to complete the proof of our theorem:
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We show that HazardGuess achieves welfare at least (8/27) · (maxiOPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥
i]). Together with lemma 4.5, this proves that HazardGuess achieves at least a 1678 approximation to social
welfare.
Let s∗ be the smallest integer such that s∗ ≥ Pr[ℓ≥s
∗]
Pr[ℓ=s∗] . Whenever s
∗ > 3, HazardGuess(D) achieves
welfare at least OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗]. When s∗ ≤ 3, HazardGuess(D) achieves welfare at least OPTs∗/3
(since it sells a single item to the highest bidder, and OPT1 ≥ OPT3/3). First consider the case in which
i > s∗ ≥ 1. In this case, we know Pr[ℓ ≥ i] ≤ Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗] · (1 − 1s∗ )
i−s∗
, since the hazard rate hi is
non-decreasing, and hs∗ ≥ 1/s∗. Therefore, we have:
OPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥ i] ≤
i
s∗
·OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
≤
i
s∗
·OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s
∗] · (1−
1
s∗
)i−s
∗
≤ (OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s
∗]) ·
(
i
s∗
·
1
ei/s∗−1
)
≤ (OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s
∗])
Therefore, in this case, HazardGuess(D) achieves welfare at least OPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥ i]/3. Now consider the
case in which 1 ≤ i < s∗: By definition of s∗: Pr[ℓ≥s
∗−1]
Pr[ℓ=s∗−1] > s
∗ − 1. Alternatively, we may write the hazard
rate at s∗ − 1: hs∗−1 < 1/(s∗ − 1). Since the hazard rate is non-decreasing, we have that for all i ≤ s∗ − 1,
hi < 1/(s
∗ − 1). Therefore we have:
Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗] =
s∗−1∏
i=1
(1− hi) >
s∗−1∏
i=1
(1−
1
s∗ − 1
) =
(
s∗ − 2
s∗ − 1
)s∗−1
If s∗ ≥ 4, then this gives Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗] ≥ 8/27. Therefore:
OPTs∗ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s
∗] ≥ OPTi · Pr[ℓ ≥ 4] ≥
8
27
OPTi
which is a bound on the performance of HazardGuess(D), since s∗ > 3. Finally we consider the special
case of s∗ ∈ {2, 3}. If s∗ = 2, then i ∈ {1, 2} achieves welfare OPTi/2·Pr[ℓ ≥ i] since HazardGuess sells
one item. Similarly, if s∗ = 3 HazardGuess achieves welfare at least OPTi/3 · Pr[ℓ ≥ i]. This concludes
the proof.
We note that our analysis is worst-case, and that this mechanism can be shown to achieve a better
constant approximation for specific distributions of interest. For example:
Theorem 4.6. HazardGuess(D) achieves a 35 -approximation to social welfare in expectation over D when
D is the uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, there are values for which HazardGuess(D)
cannot get better than a 34 -approximation when D is the uniform distribution.
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
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4.1 The Necessity of the Monotone Hazard Rate Condition
We next show that the monotone hazard rate condition is necessary: for arbitrary distributions no determin-
istic mechanism can achieve constant approximation to social welfare.
Theorem 4.7. No deterministic truthful mechanism can achieve an o(√log n/ log log n) approximation to
social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply (without the non-decreasing hazard rate condi-
tion).
We prove this theorem in Appendix A.3. The proof proceeds in two stages. First, we consider a class
of truthful mechanisms that fix -independently of the bids- an ordering π on the bidders, and a supply g.
Such a mechanism sells the first g items that arrive at the (g + 1)-st highest price to the g highest bidders ,
ordered according to π. We note that HazardGuess is such a mechanism, and all such mechanisms satisfy a
notion of envy-freeness which we define in the next section. We show that such mechanisms cannot achieve
an o(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply. We then
complete the proof by showing that we can restrict our attention to such mechanisms almost without loss of
generality: for any deterministic mechanism, there exists a mechanism that chooses its supply independently
of the bids that loses only a quadratic factor in its approximation to social welfare.
5 Envy-Free Mechanisms
All our mechanisms satisfy a notion of fairness which is our adaptation of envy-freeness to the online setting.
An offline mechanism is envy-free if no agent prefers another agent’s allocation and payment to his own (see,
for example, [11, 12]). In the case of unit demand bidders and identical goods this means that there is a price
p such that any winner pays the same price p and has value at least p, and any loser has value at most p.
This is clearly not possible to achieve for online supply, except by trivial mechanisms (for example, the
mechanism that only sells a single item to the highest bidder at the second highest price). Informally, in an
online envy-free mechanism, the only source of envy is a shortage of supply, not price discrimination on the
part of the mechanism.
Definition 5.1. A deterministic mechanism is online-envy-free if it is envy-free (in the offline sense) when
the supply is enough to satisfy the demand of all of the bidders (that is, when l = n). A randomized
mechanism is online-envy free if it is a distribution over deterministic online-envy-free mechanisms.
Note that this definition ensures that all sold items are sold for the same price, even when the supply
is smaller than n. Also note that both our mechanisms RandomGuess and HazardGuess are online-envy-free.
In Theorem 3.4 we showed that no truthful randomized mechanism can achieve an o(log log n) approx-
imation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply. Here, we present an improved lower bound
for truthful online-envy free mechanisms.
Proposition 5.2. No truthful online-envy-free mechanism (even randomized) can achieve an o(log n/ log log n)
approximation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply.
We defer the proof to appendix Section A.4. Note that proposition 5.2 is nearly tight, since Ran-
domGuess achieves a log n approximation factor.
6 Valuations with complementarities: Knapsack Valuations
So far we have discussed bidders that are interested in a single item out of a set of identical items. It is natural
to consider the case of bidders with increasing-marginal utility valuations, corresponding to complements
valuations. In the extreme case, we get knapsack valuations.
We say that a bidder i has a knapsack valuation if he has a value ci and a desired quantity ki: For all
k < ki, vi(k) = 0, and for all k ≥ ki, vi(k) = ci. That is, bidder i desires at least ki units of the good, is
not satisfied with fewer, and has no value for more than ki units.
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Knapsack valuations can be seen as modeling advertising campaigns: a buyer wishes to build brand
name recognition through banner-advertisements, and so has little value for a small number of advertise-
ments; A campaign is worth ci to the advertiser, but additional advertising saturation has little added benefit.
Unfortunately, the online nature of the problem makes knapsack valuations difficult to handle for any
algorithm, even without truthfulness (and computational) constraints. Here, we present an algorithm in the
stochastic setting, and show that its (poor) competitive ratio is optimal over the class of all (not necessarily
truthful) algorithms. Without loss of generality, we can assume that D has finite support over [1,m] for
m =
∑n
i=1 ki.
Our lower bound for Knapsack valuations shows that with online supply, no algorithm can guarantee a
better approximation ratio than the cumulative hazard rate. This welfare guarantee is quite poor. For the
uniform distribution, this gives α=Θ(logm). For the binomial distribution, α = Θ(m). We also present a
matching upper bound showing that our lower bound is tight. Both proofs are in Appendix A.5.
Proposition 6.1. No algorithm can have better than a
∑m
i=1 hi approximation to optimal social welfare.
Proposition 6.2. For any distribution D with (arbitrary) hazard rate hi there exists an algorithm that
achieves at least a
∑m
i=1 hi approximation to optimal social welfare.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof: Lower bound for deterministic mechanism with adversarial supply
In this section we prove Theorem 3.3.
Theorem A.1. No deterministic truthful mechanism can achieve better than an n approximation to social
welfare.
The theorem will follow from three simple lemmas.
Lemma A.2. For every truthful mechanism and for any realization of items, the price pb that bidder b is
charged upon winning (any) item is independent of his bid.
Proof. This is a standard fact characterizing truthful auctions; If there is some realization of items for which
bidder b has two distinct bids which result in bidder b winning an item, but at a different price, then in the
case in which his valuation is equal to the bid that yields an item at the higher price, he will report falsely
that his valuation is equal to the bid that yields an item at the lower price.
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Lemma A.3. For every truthful mechanism and for any realization of items, if bidder b wins an item, which
item bidder b wins is independent of his bid whenever pb < vb.
Proof. Suppose for some realization of items, and for some fixed set of bids of the other bidders, bidder
b can change his bid to vb or v′b, and win one of two items, item i or item j, and that if he bids his true
valuation vb, he wins item j > i. Now consider a realization in which only i items arrive; If bidder b bids
vb, he wins no item and receives utility 0. If he bids v′b, he wins item i at his (bid independent) price pb, and
achieves higher utility vb − pb. Therefore, the mechanism is not truthful.
Lemma A.4. For any deterministic mechanism that achieves an n-approximation to social welfare, every
bidder has a bid such that they are allocated the first item.
Proof. Any bidder b can set his bid to more than n times the second highest bidder. If the mechanism
does not allocate the first item to b, then if there are no further items, the mechanism has not achieved an
n-approximation to social welfare.
Proof of Theorem. By Lemma A.4, any bidder can win the first item with an appropriately high bid. But
by Lemma 3.2, any bidder such that pb < vb who has a bid for which he can win the first item cannot win
any other item with any bid. Therefore, for any set of bidders bi such that for all bi, pbi 6= vbi , then any
deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves an n-approximation can only sell the first item. If all bidders
have value 1 ≤ vbi ≤ 1 + ǫ, this achieves no better than an n-approximation when all items arrive. It
remains to demonstrate such a set of bidders: Consider an arbitrary set of n + 1 distinct values between 1
and 1 + ǫ. For each bidder, choose a value from this set independently at random. Since each bidders price
pbi is independent of his bid, by Lemma 3.1, the probability that vbi = pbi is at most 1/(n + 1), and by
the union bound, the probability that any bidders bid equals its price threshold is at most n/(n + 1) ≤ 1.
Therefore, there exists a set of bids sampled from this set with the desired property, which completes the
proof.
A.2 Proofs of Lemmas from Section 3
Lemma 3.5: Consider a set of n valuations drawn from V and let OPTk denote the sum of the k highest
valuations from the set. Then:
E[OPTk] ≥ Hk+1 − 1.
where Hk+1 denotes the k + 1st harmonic number. In particular, E[OPTk] > (log k)/2.
Proof. Let F (y) denote the cumulative distribution function of V . We note that F (y) is a step function
taking values F (y) = (n − 1/y)/(n − 1) for all y of the form y = 1/2i for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , log n − 1}.
We consider the inverse CDF function F−1(x) : [0, 1] → {1, 1/2, 1/4, . . . , 2/n}. It is simple to verify the
following pointwise lower bound on F−1(x):
F−1(x) ≥
1
n− x(n− 1)
which follows from inverting the discrete CDF. We denote the quantity in this bound A(x) = 1/(n−x(n−
1)), and observe that A(x) is convex in the range [0, 1].
Let vi,n denote the i’th largest value out of n draws from V , and let Xi,n denote the i’th largest value out
of n draws from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. We consider the following method of drawing a value
v from V : we draw x uniformly from [0, 1] and let v = F−1(x). Since F−1 is monotone, the i’th largest
draw from the uniform distribution corresponds to the i’th largest draw from V : vi = F−1(xi).
Recall the expected value of the i’th largest of n draws from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]:
E[Xi,n] = 1 − i/(n + 1). This standard fact follows from a simple symmetry argument. We are now
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ready to complete the proof of the lemma:
E[OPTk] =
k∑
i=1
E[vi,n]
=
k∑
i=1
E[F−1(Xi,n)]
≥
k∑
i=1
E[A(Xi,n)]
≥
k∑
i=1
A(E[Xi,n])
=
k∑
i=1
1
1 + i(n− 1)/(n + 1)
≥
k∑
i=1
1
1 + i
= H(k + 1)− 1
where the second inequality is an application of Jensen’s inequality, which follows since A(x) is convex.
Lemma 3.6: For ci ∈ [0, log n− 1]:
n∑
i=bk+1
(ci + 1)
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj
n−1 )
< 2.5 · n
Proof. Let f(cbk+1, . . . , cn)) ≡
∑n
i=bk+1
(ci+1)
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2
cj
n−1
)
. We consider the partial derivative at the i’th
offer price:
∂
∂ci
f(cbk+1, . . . , cn) =
1
e
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj /(n−1)
−
(
2ci ln 2
(n− 1)e2
ci/(n−1)
)
·
n∑
j=i+1
cj + 1
exp(
∑j−1
ℓ=bk+1 ℓ 6=i
2cℓ/(n − 1))
≤ 1−
ln 2
n− 1
·

 n∑
j=i+1
cj + 1
exp(
∑j−1
ℓ=bk+1 ℓ 6=i
2cℓ/(n− 1))


But this is negative unless
Ri ≡
n∑
j=i+1
cj + 1
exp(
∑j−1
ℓ=bk+1 ℓ 6=i
2cℓ/(n − 1))
≤
n− 1
ln 2
Fixing any maximal assignment to the ci variables, let i′ be the largest index for which the above con-
dition on Ri′ fails to hold. We know that for all i ≤ i′, ci = 0, since the partial derivative at i is negative,
and so if we could reduce ci further this would contradict the fact that we selected a maximal assignment.
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Therefore, we have:
f(cbk+1, . . . , cn) =
i′∑
i=bk+1
ci + 1
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj
n−1 )
+
n∑
i=i′+1
ci + 1
exp(
Pi−1
j=bk+1
2cj
n−1 )
≤ i′ +
1
e2
ci/(n−1)
·Ri
≤ n+
n− 1
ln 2
< 2.5n
Proposition A.5 (Proposition 3.7). RandomGuess is truthful, online-envy-free, and achieves a log n approx-
imation to social welfare.
Proof. Truthfulness and envy-freeness are immediate: every winning bidder faces a single take-it-or-leave-
it offer independent of their bid, in an order independent of their bid. All items are sold at the same price,
vg+1. When n items arrive, all bidders with valuations higher than the offer price have been allocated items.
We now prove the approximation guarantee.
Suppose that I items arrive, and OPTI =
∑I
i=1 vi, the sum of the I highest bids. With probability
1/ log n, I < g ≤ 2I , and with probability 1/ log n, I/2 < g ≤ I . In the first case, RandomGuess allocates
the I items to at least half of the top g bidders in random order, and so achieves welfare in expectation
at least OPTg/2 ≥ OPTI/2. In the second case, RandomGuess allocates at least half of the I items to
all of the top g bidders, and achieves welfare OPTg =
∑g
i=1 vi. Since g > I/2, OPTg > OPTI/2
because {vi} is a non-increasing sequence. Our mechanism therefore achieves in expectation welfare at
least (1/ log n)(OPTI/2 +OPTI/2) = OPTI/ log n.
A.3 Proofs from Section 4
Lemma 4.4: For any s ≥ 1 and hi ∈ [1/s, 1]:
n∑
i=s+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)

 ≤ 3s+ 1
Proof. Let f(hs+1, . . . , hn) ≡
∑n
i=s+1(i · hi ·
∏i−1
j=s+1(1− hj)) and consider the partial derivative at hk:
∂
∂hk
f(hs+1, . . . , hn) = k ·
k−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)−
n∑
i=k+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1,j 6=k
(1− hj)


≤ k · (1−
1
s
)k−s−1 −
n∑
i=k+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1,j 6=k
(1− hj)


where the inequality follows from hi ≥ 1/s for all i. But this is negative unless
Rk ≡
n∑
i=k+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1,j 6=k
(1− hj)

 ≤ k · (1− 1
s
)k−s−1
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Fix some assignment to the hi that maximizes f(hs+1, . . . , hn) and let k′ be the first index at which the
above condition holds. Then for all i < k′, hi = 1/s, since otherwise this would contradict the fact that the
assignment maximizes f . Therefore, we have:
n∑
i=s+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)

 = k
′−1∑
i=s+1

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)

+ n∑
i=k′

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)


≤
k′−1∑
i=s+1
(
i
s
(1−
1
s
)i−s−1
)
+
n∑
i=k′

i · hi · i−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj)


=
k′−1∑
i=s+1
(
i
s
(1−
1
s
)i−s−1
)
+ k′ · hk′ ·
k′−1∏
j=s+1
(1− hj) + (1− hk′) · Rk′
≤
k′−1∑
i=s+1
(
i
s
(1−
1
s
)i−s−1
)
+ hk′(·k
′ · (1−
1
s
)k
′−s−1) + (1− hk′)(k
′ · (1−
1
s
)k
′−s−1)
=
1
s
k′−1∑
i=s+1
(
i(1 −
1
s
)i−s−1
)
+ k′ · (1−
1
s
)k
′−s−1
≤
1
s
∞∑
i=s+1
(
i(1 −
1
s
)i−s−1
)
+ (s+ 1)
= 3s+ 1
where the second inequality follows from the fact that for all i, hi ≥ 1/s, the third inequality follows from
the fact that k ≥ s + 1 and so k′ · (1 − 1s )
k′−s−1 is decreasing in k′, and the last equality follows from the
identity
∑∞
i=k i · r
i−k = (k + r − kr)/(r − 1)2.
Theorem 4.6:HazardGuess(D) achieves a 35 -approximation to social welfare in expectation over D
when D is the uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, there are values for which HazardGuess(D)
cannot get better than a 34 -approximation when D is the uniform distribution.
Proof. Consider the case that there are n agents and the supply is chosen uniformly at random from {1, n}
(we note that if the range starts from a number larger than 1 the problem becomes easier and the algorithm
achieves better approximation.) We analyze the approximation achieved by picking the supply k = n/2 and
selling at most k items,6 in a random order over the top k values. We prove that the algorithm achieves at
least 60% of the optimum.
Assume the values are sorted v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Define OPTl =
∑l
i=1 vi. The expected welfare of
the optimal algorithms is OPT = 1/n ·
∑n
l=1OPTl. Splitting the sum to two parts we get the following.
OPT =
1
n
·
n
2∑
l=1
OPTl+
1
n
·
n∑
l=n
2
+1
OPTl ≤
OPTn
2
2
+
1
n
·
n∑
l=n
2
+1
l
n/2
OPTn
2
= OPTn
2

1
2
+
2
n2
n∑
l=n
2
+1
l

 =
OPTn
2
(
1
2
+
2
n2
(
n(n+ 1)
2
−
n
2 (
n
2 + 1)
2
))
= OPTn
2
(
5
4
+
1
2n
)
Our algorithm achieves expected welfare of
ALG =
1
n
·
n
2∑
l=1
l
n/2
OPTn
2
+
1
n
·
n∑
l=n
2
+1
OPTn
2
= OPTn
2

 2
n2
n
2∑
l=1
l +
1
2

 =
6For simplicity we assume that n is even. Essentially the same argument will work for the case that n is odd.
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OPTn
2
(
2
n2
n
2 (
n
2 + 1)
2
+
1
2
)
= OPTn
2
(
3
4
+
1
2n
)
≥
OPT
5
4 +
1
2n
·
(
3
4
+
1
2n
)
≥
3
5
OPT
Finally we observe that this algorithm gets at most 75% of the optimum. Consider the input with one
value of 1 and all the rest of the values are 0. The optimal algorithm will always get welfare of 1. Our
algorithm will get the 1 with probability
n/2∑
l=1
1
n
·
l
n/2
+
1
2
=
n+ 1
4n
+
1
2
< α
for any constant α > 3/4 when n is large enough.
Theorem 4.7: No deterministic truthful mechanism can achieve an o(
√
log n/ log log n) approximation
to social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply (without the non-decreasing hazard rate con-
dition).
The theorem follows directly from two lemmas.
Definition A.6. A bid-independent supply mechanism chooses an ordering on the bidders π and a supply g
independently of the bids. It then sells items as they arrive to the g highest bidders, ordered according to π,
at the g + 1st highest price.
Note that all mechanisms presented in this paper are bid-independent supply mechanisms.
Lemma A.7. No deterministic bid-independent supply mechanism can achieve an o(log n/ log log n) ap-
proximation to social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply (without the non-decreasing haz-
ard rate condition).
Proof. We give a distribution with a decreasing hazard rate such that no mechanism that determines a maxi-
mum supply g independent of the bids vi can achieve an o(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare.
We define D such that Pr[ℓ = i] = 1/(i + i2). Note that Pr[ℓ ≥ i] = 1/i, and the hazard rate at i
is decreasing: hi(D) = 1/(1 + i). Consider the welfare achieved by a bid-independent mechanism that
chooses supply g. If at least g items arrive, it achieves welfare exactly OPTg. Otherwise, if j < g items
arrive, it achieves expected welfare at most (j/g)OPTg. Therefore, the welfare it achieves is at most:
OPTg · Pr[ℓ ≥ g] +
1
g
·
g−1∑
j=1
j · Pr[ℓ = j] = OPTg · (
1
g
+
Hg − 1
g
)
= Θ
(
OPTg · (
log g
g
)
)
We consider two possible sets of bidder values: In the Single Bidder case, we have v1 = 1 and vj = 0
for all j > 1. In the All Bidder case, we have vj = 1 for all j. Note that in the Single Bidder case, we
have OPT = 1 and OPTi = 1 for all i. In the All Bidder case we have OPT = Hn+1 − 1 = Θ(log n)
and OPTi = i. Therefore, in the Single Bidder case, a mechanism that achieved an o(log n/ log log n)
approximation to social welfare would have (log g)/g = ω(log log n/ log n), and in the All Bidder case
would have log g = ω(log log n). There is no g ∈ [1, n] that satisfies both of these equations simultaneously.
Since g is chosen independently of the bids, the two cases are indistinguishable, and any such mechanism
much achieve an approximation ratio no better than Ω(log n/ log log n) in at least one of them.
Lemma A.8. For any distribution D and any deterministic truthful mechanism M that achieves an α ap-
proximation to social welfare over D, there is a truthful deterministic online-envy-free bid-independent
supply mechanism M ′ that achieves an α2 approximation to social welfare.
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Proof. Let gmax be the maximum number of items M sells when full supply is realized, where the maximum
is taken over all possible bid profiles. Let M ′ be the mechanism that always sells the first gmax items to the
gmax highest bidders in some predetermined order at the gmax+1st highest price, and sells no further items.
Note that M ′ is online-envy-free and has bid-independent sell sequence. First observe that OPTgmax ≥
OPT/α. This follows because by definition, M can never achieve welfare beyond OPTgmax , but by
assumption, M achieves an α approximation to the optimal social welfare. Next, observe that PrD[ℓ ≥
gmax] ≥ 1/α. To see this, consider some bid profile which causes M to produce a supply gmax. Let bi be the
bidder who receives item gmax, and consider raising his valuation vi until it constitutes all but a negligible
fraction of the total possible social welfare. By lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, raising bi’s bid does not affect either
the supply offered by the mechanism, or the order in which bi receives an item: that is, it continues to be
the case that bi receives an item if and only if at least gmax items arrive. However, since bi now constitutes
an arbitrarily large fraction of the total social welfare, and M is an α-approximation mechanism, it must be
that Pr[ℓ ≥ gmax] ≥ 1/α.
Finally, we observe that our mechanism achieves welfare at least OPTgmax ·Pr[ℓ ≥ gmax] ≥ OPT/α2,
which completes the proof.
A.4 Proofs from Section 5
Proposition A.9 (Proposition 5.2). No truthful online-envy-free mechanism can achieve an o(log n/ log log n)
approximation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply.
Proof. For an envy-free mechanism, we may assume that all offered prices c1, . . . , cn are equal: for all i,
ci = c. We apply inequality 1 to obtain constraints for the case in which n items arrive, and the case in
which 1 item arrives. When n items arrive, we have for all i Pr[Ni−1 < n] = 1, and obtain the constraint:
n · c ≥
(n − 1) log n
2α
− n (5)
When a single item arrives, we have Pr[Ni−1 < 1] = ((n− 2c+1)/(n− 1))i−1, since each bidder indepen-
dently accepts the offer price 1/2c with probability (2c+1− 1)/(n− 1). Also, OPT1 ≥ 1/2. We obtain the
constraint:
(c+ 1) ·
n∑
i=1
(
n− 2c+1
n− 1
)i−1
≥
n− 1
2α
(6)
Setting α = o(log n/ log log n), we see that constraint 5 requires c = ω(log log n). It is simple to verify
that the left hand side of constraint 6 is decreasing in c in the range [log log n, log(n) − 1], and that setting
c = ω(log log n) fails to satisfy 6, which proves the claim.
A.5 Proofs from Section 6
We begin by presenting a lower bound for Knapsack utilities.
Proposition A.10 (Proposition 6.1). No algorithm can guarantee better than a ∑mi=1 hi approximation to
optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary distribution D and scale it so that it has positive support on [m + 1, 2m].
Alternately, imagine it has positive support on [1,m], and that m items are guaranteed to arrive; the distri-
bution is on how many additional items will arrive. We construct a set of n = m bidders 1, . . . ,m. Bidder
i has ki = m+ i and ci = 1/Pr[ℓ ≥ i]. By construction, at most one bidder can have his demand satisfied
by any knapsack size. Since bidder values are non-decreasing, we have
OPT =
m∑
i=1
ci · Pr[ℓ = i] =
m∑
i=1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
=
m∑
i=1
hi
However, since at most one bidder can be satisfied by any knapsack size, no algorithm can do better than
picking some bidder i and assigning all items that arrive to bidder i. Such an algorithm achieves welfare ci
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in the case that ki items arrive. By construction, this yields expected welfare (1/Pr[ℓ ≥ i]) · Pr[ℓ ≥ i] = 1,
which completes the proof.
KnapsackGuess(D):
1. Solicit bids. For each bidder i, create a knapsack instance with one item corresponding to each bidder i,
with size ki and value ci. For each s ∈ [1,m] let OPTs be the value of the optimal solution to
this knapsack instance when the knapsack has size s.
2. Let s∗ = argmaxs Pr[ℓ ≥ s] ·OPTs.
3. Assign items as they arrive to bidders corresponding to the optimal solution for a knapsack of size s∗
in an arbitrary order, until each bidder i in the solution has received his demand, ki items.
Remark A.11. Rather than solving the knapsack problem exactly to find OPTs, we can use the greedy-by-
density algorithm to find a 2-approximation. 7 It is simple to see that the greedy knapsack algorithm can
only ever output at most 2n distinct solutions, regardless of knapsack size. Therefore, at the cost of a factor
of 2, our algorithm only has to consider 2n solutions, each of which can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition A.12 (Proposition 6.2). For any distribution D with (arbitrary) hazard rate hi KnapsackGuess(D)
achieves at least a
∑m
i=1 hi approximation to optimal social welfare.
Proof. KnapsackGuess(D) achieves welfare OPTs∗ whenever s∗ items arrive, which occurs with probabil-
ity Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗]. Therefore, KnapsackGuess achieves welfare at least OPTs∗ ·Pr[ℓ ≥ s∗] ≥ OPTs′ ·Pr[ℓ ≥
s′] for all s′. Let OPT denote the expected optimal welfare when the number of items to be sold is drawn
from D. If KnapsackGuess achieves no better than an α approximation to social welfare, then for all
s′ ∈ [1,m]: OPTs′ · Pr[ℓ ≥ s
′] ≤ OPT/α, or equivalently:
OPTs′ ≤
OPT
αPr[ℓ ≥ s′]
.
By definition:
OPT =
m∑
i=1
OPTi · Pr[ℓ = i].
Using our above bound on OPTi:
OPT ≤
m∑
i=1
OPT ·
Pr[ℓ = i]
αPr[ℓ ≥ i]
.
Therefore:
α ≤
m∑
i=1
Pr[ℓ = i]
Pr[ℓ ≥ i]
=
m∑
i=1
hi
which completes the proof.
7The greedy-by-density algorithm first discard all items of size larger than the knapsack size and then picks the best of the
following two allocations: the greedy-by-density allocation that picks requests in decreasing ratio of value to size until the next
element does not fit, and the allocation that gives all the items to the request of highest value.
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